Donald Trump’s ban will have lasting and damaging effects on the world’s refugees

US President Donald Trump’s executive order on immigration fundamentally alters decades of bipartisan US practice. It blocks immigration from seven predominantly Muslim countries, and stops all refugee resettlement for at least 120 days.

Trump’s justification for the order is:

… the US must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles.

The first element includes blocking any immigration from seven countries – Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen – for at least 30 days.

The first day after the order was approved dual citizens and US permanent residents – usually called green card holders – were prevented from boarding flights to the US and even detained on arrival. A temporary injunction has provided at least some protections, though it is being applied patchily and only to those people who have already entered the US.

The order also suspends all refugee admissions for a minimum of 120 days. After that the US will still admit only nationals of countries where the government has “procedures [that] are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the US”.

In a continuation of current congressional practice, the US will also prioritise refugee claims based on religious-based persecution, where the person is a member of a minority religion in their own country. And no Syrian refugees will be admitted until the US refugee admissions program aligns with the national interest.

Finally, the US will limit the number of refugees it admits in 2017 to 50,000. So, what does this all mean for refugees?

What does it mean for refugee acceptance?

The UN Refugee Convention provides refugees with a strong set of rights. However, it applies only when a refugee is within a signatory country’s territory or jurisdiction. The convention does not oblige any signatory to accept other refugees.

However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers resettlement to be one of three “durable solutions” for refugees, alongside voluntary repatriation and integration in a host community. These solutions enable refugees to live their lives in dignity and peace.

The UNHCR has determined, in most cases, that the people awaiting resettlement are refugees. Resettlement is used especially in cases where a refugee’s:

… life, liberty, safety, health, or fundamental human rights are at risk in their country of refuge.

Thus resettlement can be critical to provide refugees with protection.

Resettlement also has important geostrategic implications. It helps, as several former US government officials have noted, support the stability of allies that are struggling to host large numbers of refugees.

Similarly, in a call with Trump on Sunday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly argued that:

… the necessary, decisive battle against terrorism does not justify a general suspicion against people of a certain origin or a certain religion.

The US resettlement program has long had strong bipartisan support. But it is also critical to global refugee resettlement. The US takes in by far the most resettled refugees of any country. Canada and Australia are a distant second and third.

Top ten countries for refugee resettlement in 2015. IRIN News refer to image above

The justification for the shutdown is to improve the US’s own security measures by introducing, as Trump has previously argued, “extreme vetting”.

But this already exists for resettled refugees. As part of the Refugee Admissions Program, individual refugee cases are screened through a seven-step process, including security and background checks, personal interviews with agents from the US Department of Homeland Security, and other measures. This process can take up to two years.

This system has worked; virtually no terrorist attacks on US soil have been caused by refugees. As a September 2016 report by the Cato Institute, a right-leaning think-tank, noted:

The chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a refugee is one in 3.64 billion per year.

Similarly, in 2015, a State Department spokesperson said of the nearly 785,000 refugees admitted to the US since 2001:

Only about a dozen – a tiny fraction of 1% of admitted refugees – have been arrested or removed from the US due to terrorism concerns that existed prior to their resettlement in the US. None of them were Syrian.

The wider effects

Trump’s ban will also have two wider effects.

It appears not to be affecting the November agreement between Australia’s prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, and Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, to resettle refugees from Nauru and Manus Island in the US in exchange for Australia accepting a group of Central American refugees. Many of those on Nauru and Manus Island come from Iran, Iraq and Somalia.

The Australian government remains keen for the deal to go ahead. But US Republican politicians have previously been critical of the deal. Republican congressman Brian Babin said earlier this month he was confident that Trump:

… will do everything in his power to put an immediate stop to this secret Australian-US refugee deal that should have simply never happened in the first place.

But in a phone call between Trump and Turnbull on Sunday, Trump appears to have given assurances the deal would still go ahead. The order gives the power to the secretary of homeland security to continue to admit refugees for resettlement on a case-by-case basis, irrespective of the wider shutdown.

Globally, the shutdown will have lasting and detrimental effects for refugees. In the Middle East, it may prove to be a boon to the Islamic State. The terrorist group has long sought to disrupt refugee movements.

The ban will also put more pressure on refugee-hosting countries. About 90% of the world’s refugees are in the developing world. The international refugee system works through burden-sharing: host countries know that at least some refugees will be resettled and that they will receive financial assistance for the refugees from the UNHCR and other organisations and governments.

Trump’s move challenges this directly, and will likely lead to further restrictions on the ability of refugees to receive basic protections.

This is reprinted from The Conversation

Phil Orchard is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, and the Research Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. His research focuses on international efforts to provide legal and institutional protections to forced migrants and war-affected civilians. He is the author of A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2014), which won the 2016 International Studies Association Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies Section Distinguished Book Award, and the forthcoming book Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality (Routledge, 2017). He is also the co-editor, with Alexander Betts, of Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice (Oxford University Press, 2014). He tweets @p_orchard.

The Future of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon


I bounce cheerful nine month old Hasan on my lap briefly before he starts to cry.  His mother informs me he takes time to get to know strangers and then she tells me that he is unregistered.  Legally the little person that I hold in my arms does not exist; and this is just one of the difficulties Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing.

The situation of the Syrian refugees is steadily deteriorating.  A joint report on the vulnerability of Syrian refugees in Lebanon issued on 16 December by the WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR is clear on this.  Key areas of risk are in the areas of schooling, food and job security, personal safety and inadequate nutrition for children.  The official number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is 1,017,433 but these may not accurately reflect reality.  Recently a Palestinian friend in the camp of Burj al-Barajneh informed me that the number of people in the camp (both Syrian and Palestinian) has doubled from around 17,000 to 40,000 since the war began and tensions between new and old residents are high.

I have spent considerable time in Lebanon since 2011 when the Syrian war began and I didn’t need a report to show me how the situation is worsening.  But in my view it is important to look at both sides of the coin.  Lebanon is a small state still in the process of recovering from a protracted civil war, occupation by Syria and Israel, and it remains vulnerable to security threats from non-state actors.  I have both Syrian and Lebanese friends and I have deep sympathy for both sides.

Alerting the international community to the situation is useful and important.  But to the Lebanese any critique of the current situation comes across as hypocritical when most wealthy states are not accommodating the refugees in anything like the numbers that Lebanon is.  As an observer of how this situation is playing out on the ground in Lebanon, I believe the way forward in this crisis is to establish collaborative projects that work to ameliorate the worst of the fears of the Lebanese which are: that their job opportunities are undermined by the presence of the refugees; that the Syrians will never leave Lebanon thus altering the sectarian and cultural balance of the country; and that the Syrian community represents a security threat to the local population.

This last perception is largely born of a suicide bomb attack that took place in the tiny village of Al Qaa in northern Lebanon whereby eight suicide bombers attacked a Christian village in the space of one day.  This has led to the imposition of curfews on Syrian movement in many villages across Lebanon with most curfews being from 8pm to 8am each day.  One of the major challenges therefore for any grassroots peacebuilding organisations is to work with the communities to alleviate threat perceptions on both sides.

Finding sustainable ways to assist Syrians in finding employment that does not threaten Lebanese job opportunities is possibly a more challenging task as many Lebanese are hiring Syrians in the knowledge that they will work for less money thereby cutting business costs and cutting out Lebanese who also need the work. A useful task would be to try to develop local projects that will assist in generating an income for Syrians but will also benefit the local community.

The fear that the Syrians will never leave is more challenging to address because this depends on circumstances beyond the control of the Lebanese Government. Whilst all Syrian refugees I have ever met in Lebanon are adamant they want to return home and do not wish to remain in Lebanon; the situation in Syria has the potential to go in one of two ways that could well prevent Syrian refugees from returning home.

Firstly, there is a risk of an increase in the sectarian nature of the conflict.  Currently most refugees I speak to don’t speak of the war in sectarian terms, rather they talk of ‘al-Hukumah’ (the government) versus ‘al-Madineen’ (the civilians).  But were a protracted conflict to develop, it would most likely be comprised of pro-Assad and Shi’a (possibly also Christian) militia versus Sunni-backed forces.  In this scenario it is unlikely the majority of refugees will feel the country is safe enough to return to.  The insecurity of living under those conditions is well known to the Lebanese who suffered through regular checkpoint killings based on religious status during the civil war.

The second risk relates to the increasing possibility that Assad will win the war but regard those who left the country as being de facto enemies of the state.  His internal security mechanisms remain strong and this may also prevent Syrians from returning for fear of persecution.  This is reminiscent of the Vietnamese camps in Hong Kong in the early 1990s which remained long after the Vietnam War had ended due to fears of persecution.  There is another path for Syria however.  After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 Hizbullah were quick to establish an edict ordering non-recrimination or persecution of Lebanese who had worked with the Israelis in the occupied zone.  This edict was respected by the local population and the government and proved extremely helpful in maintaining peace and security in the south. A similar pledge would be required for post-war Syria.

The recent joint report is important because the toll that the Syrian war is taking on both Lebanon and the Syrian refugees is getting worse and the need to find sustainable solutions is imperative.  All sides need to respect the point of view of the other and the international community needs to work with the Lebanese Government and offer assistance at the local level in ways that can help alleviate the stress of the situation.  Grassroots peacebuilding is what is needed to ensure that tensions do not reach a point where conflict erupts between groups which would further threaten the stability of Lebanon and the security of the refugees.

Dr. Vanessa Newby
Research Fellow & Teaching Coordinator
Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs,ANU College of Asia and the Pacific ,The Australian National University

Action needed to resolve Rakhine Crisis

Noel Morada, Alex Bellamy and Sarah Teitt, Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
3 December 2016

The ongoing crisis in Rakhine, Myanmar is once again a major concern for neighbouring ASEAN member states. It has been close to two months since the 9 October attacks by suspected militants in Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships against border and security forces. Military operations continue in these areas where a large community of stateless Rohingyas live, some 10,000 of whom have already fled to Bangladesh where they are also not welcome. in The NLD government rejected allegations made by international human rights organisations about abuses committed by security forces against the Muslim community in Rakhine since the attacks. As of mid-November, the state media reported that civilian and military casualties reached more than 130, with 102 militants and 32 soldiers killed.

Rallies at the Myanmar embassies in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur were held last week to protest the continuing lockdown operations in Rakhine and violence against the stateless Rohingyas. Thus far, Malaysia has taken the strongest stance among ASEAN members in denouncing the Myanmar government’s response to the crisis. No less than the Prime Minister of Malaysia is reported to be joining a protest rally in Kuala Lumpur on 4 December where other politicians and NGOs concerned with the plight of the Rohingyas are expected to attend. The Malaysian foreign ministry last week summoned the Myanmar ambassador to Kuala Lumpur over the violence in Rakhine even as the cabinet issued a strong criticism against the NLD government on the issue. A youth minister in particular called for a review of Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN in light of allegations made by some UN officials about ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity being committed against the Rohingyas. In Indonesia, calls for stronger ASEAN response against Myanmar were also made by some government officials, civil society organisations, and the media. A scheduled visit this month to Jakarta by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has been postponed due to the ongoing crisis in Rakhine.

Meanwhile, some 13 political parties in Myanmar that includes the former ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) on 28 November issued a joint statement calling on the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) dominated by the Tatmadaw (military) to hold an emergency meeting and to intervene in order to solve the various crises in the country, citing primarily the violence in Arakan (Rakhine). Specifically, it blamed the incompetence of the NLD government in handling these problems and alleged that “there is a systematic plan by domestic and overseas elements to cripple the nation’s defences and border regions.”1 The statement called for measures that will “effectively counter domestic and overseas threats” and for the NLD to “show some courage” in telling the international community that the crisis in western and northern Myanmar were linked to “terrorist organisations” with international connections.2

We join the international community in expressing our deep concern over the continuing crisis in Rakhine where ongoing military operations against militants have severely affected both Muslim and Buddhist communities in the area. We support the call of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng for the Myanmar government “to demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law and to the human rights of all its populations.” Specifically, the government and the military in Myanmar should allow access to humanitarian assistance to affected communities in northern Rakhine as well as verification of allegations of human rights violations against the Rohingyas. While recognising the difficult position of the ruling NLD in managing the crisis, the people of Myanmar should be vigilant in supporting its democratically-elected civilian government.
We support calls for ASEAN to be more pro-active in responding to the crisis in Rakhine and use its existing mechanisms in helping the Myanmar government to effectively put a stop to alleged human rights violations against the Rohingyas and other affected communities in the area. In the context of humanitarian crisis and alleged crimes against humanity possibly being committed, ASEAN members should step up and call on the Myanmar government and the military to uphold the primarily responsibility of the state to protect its populations from atrocity crimes.

1 “13 parties call for NDSC intervention,” 29 November 2016, from, accessed on 1 December 2016.

1 “13 parties call for NDSC intervention,” 29 November 2016, from, accessed on 1 December 2016.

The Situation in Rakhine, Myanmar


Boats in the Kaladan River, Rakhine State, Myanmar Burma – Anne Dirkse,

Noel M. Morada, Alex Bellamy and Sarah Teitt
Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

In the early morning of 9 October, a group of some 250 armed men attacked two border police and outposts in Mungdaw and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine, Myanmar, resulting in the death of nine policemen.  This was followed by clashes that killed five Myanmar army troops, with some 15 men reportedly killed and four other detained by the military in follow up operations after the attack in Mungdaw village.  The border gates between Bangladesh and Myanmar were closed indefinitely and some 400 schools in the area were ordered to close on 10 October.   Three days after the attack, the situation in Mungdaw township has reportedly returned to calm with no further attacks or clashes, even as government troops continue to inspect the area in search of the assailants.

A number of exiled Rohingya community organisations have denounced what they describe as “state violence” against the villagers (the majority of whom self-identify as Rohingya) during the search operations in Mungdaw.  However, the state government in Rakhine has denied that the military’s follow-up operations targeted civilians and has asserted that the casualties were suspected militants.  For their part, local Muslim civil society organisations in Myanmar condemned the border attacks and expressed concerns that these could lead to further violence in Rakhine.  In particular, the head of Myanmar Muslim Lawyers Association considered these “terrorist attacks” as unacceptable, while other Muslim CSOs condemned “any destructive act as detrimental to the peace and stability” of Myanmar.[1]

Meanwhile, Aung San Suu Kyi was careful not to accuse any individual or organization for the attacks until the evidence have been established on who the perpetrators are.  She pointed out that her government would manage the situation in Rakhine fairly and in accordance with the law.[2]  For his part, Al-haj U Aye Lwin, a Muslim member of the Arakan State Advisory Commission created by the NLD government to address the communal tensions in Rakhine, was also careful not to make any public statement about the Mungdaw attacks but said that he personally cannot accept acts of violence and that “harsh punishment must be given to the attackers.”  At the same time, he also pointed out that extra caution must be taken so that those who are not involved in the violence are not adversely affected.[3]  These cautious statements are laudable and in stark contrast to earlier statements made by other Myanmar officials who seem to immediately blame the Rohingyas in Rakhine for the attacks.[4]

We support the people and government of Myanmar and the international community in condemning these violent border attacks in Rakhine.  The balanced approach that both the highest leadership in the NLD and state governments have taken in responding to the situation in Mungdaw clearly demonstrate their resolve to avert further violence which could exacerbate communal tensions in Rakhine.  Other officials of the central government should support Aung San Suu Kyi’s sober and prudent response to the situation in Rakhine.  While the military conducts follow up operations in pursuit of those who responsible for these attacks, the NLD government and law enforcement agencies must bear the primary responsibility to protect affected civilians and ensure that fundamental human rights are protected. Alleged violations by any party should be thoroughly and impartially investigated.  Media and civil society groups within and outside Myanmar can also contribute to averting further escalation of violence in Rakhine by preventing incitement of communal tensions through fair, accurate and balanced reporting and by promoting inter-faith dialogue and understanding.

ASEAN and the international community should encourage and support Myanmar and Bangladesh in giving priority to enhancing their border security cooperation following the Mungdaw and Rathedaung attacks, which is one of the root causes of communal conflicts in Rakhine.

We join the international community in condemning these attacks on Myanmar’s security forces and in calling for prudence and restraint. Rakhine’s problems cannot be solved through violence but only through dialogue, understanding and the fulfillment of the Responsibility to Protect principle.

[1] Htun Htun, “Local Muslim Community Condemns Mungdaw Attacks,”  The Irrawady, 12 October 2016,, accessed on 13 October 2016.

[2] Htet Naing Zaw, “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Responds to Arakan State Attacks,” The Irrawady, 12 October 2016,, accessed on 13 October 2016.

[3] Htun Htun, ibid.

[4] “Security tightens in Rakhine State following police killings,” Eleven News, 10 October 2016, from, accessed on 13 October 2016.

‘UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial focuses on military planning and performance when strategic political guidance is still missing’.

This article draws on a article published by the  IPI Global Observatory,

Dr Charles Hunt is a Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and  is a Vice-Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Global Research and the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Australia



UN peace operations play a critical role in responding to today’s international peace and security challenges. They are deployed in greater numbers in response to more complex conflict situations than ever before to protect civilians from direct harm as well as to conduct a host of other tasks such as supporting the (re)building of state institutions, facilitating humanitarian aid, and overseeing political commitments.

Despite admirable aims, many of these missions are failing to meet their objectives. In South Sudan, the UN has failed to protect the thousands of civilians[1] seeking refuge inside and adjacent to UN bases. In Mali, the mission struggles to protect itself, let alone anyone else. Efforts to stabilize the Democratic Republic of the Congo rely on bargains with unpalatable governments that can undermine the impartiality of the UN.[2] The reputation of the organization is being further eroded by instances of sexual exploitation by UN personnel such as recent allegations in the Central African Republic.[3] UN peacekeeping is straining to cope with enormous challenges and requires major reform.

Recognising these maladies, a ‘UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial’ meeting was held in London on 8 September – only the second-ever meeting of Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Defense focused specifically on peacekeeping.[4] The meeting brought together representatives of around 70 member states indicating widespread international support for making peacekeeping fit for purpose in the 21st Century.[5]

The gathering produced some laudable achievements. 31 countries made new pledges with a significant portion of these earmarked for much-needed rapid deployment.[6] Additional ‘mission enablers’ such as intelligence gathering capacities, engineering units, field hospitals and strategic air assets were also pledged.[7] Emphasis was placed on: increasing the number of women in peacekeeping, including in senior positions; establishing a UN Training of Trainers Centre; and producing more competent and courageous leadership that is also accountable for poor performance.

The meeting culminated with a Communiqué[8] that put forward a ‘blueprint’ for improving UN peace operations anchored on ‘3 Ps’ – better planning, additional pledges and improving performance. If implemented, the commitments therein should improve peace operations, however, the meeting and the communiqué skirted over important lingering issues.

First, commitments refer to technical attempts to treat symptoms rather than political responses to their causes. The ‘3 Ps’ fail to sufficiently take into account key findings of the recent High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report[9] highlighting the primacy of politics in enabling effective missions in the future – a 4th and perhaps most important ‘P’. There can be no exclusively military solution to the conflicts that peace operations address. Peacekeeping – and any use of force by peacekeepers – must be deployed in support of a political strategy, not as a substitute for one.[10] The Communiqué’s says little about how political planning should look but instead focused on military and technical planning for clear and sequenced mandates. While it does recall the “…renewed focus on the primacy of politics”, in the HIPPO report, it offered little indication of what that means, who is responsible for ensuring it, or where it fits into the reform agenda going forward. Consequently, the conference avoided grappling with the difficult questions of the politics of modern peace operations and implications for the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.

Second, this was a highly militarized affair with all the pomp and ceremony that brings. While many civilian experts attended – and no-doubt performed the leg-work behind the scenes – the fact remains that this was a gathering of ministers and chiefs of defence. This portrays a peace operations system where military actors heavily influence decision-making. This is sensible when it comes to troop contributions and military hardware but it makes little sense regarding other vital civilian components or, more importantly, when crafting the political strategies that underpin peace operations.

Peace operations are not the right tool for responding to all violent conflict. Where there is no peace to keep, the Security Council may need to consider enforcement action and stabilization operations in order to protect civilians and prevent the escalation of violence. However, to do so under the auspices of UN peace operations is to jeopardize the fragile consensus that enables it. The unintended consequences of stretching or manipulating them may be severe – potentially jeopardizing the agreed upon principles, threatening the force generation base and possibly undermining the viability of the whole enterprise.[11] Some have argued that it may therefore be necessary to develop another modality – with associated doctrine and frameworks – to execute such missions.[12]

In the meantime, UN peacekeeping must muddle through. The London meeting’s tangible steps to close the capacity gaps plaguing current missions give cause for hope. “Doing better with more,” sounds like a better proposition than “doing more with less” – the mantra of peacekeeping in austerity-shaped early 2000s. However, what is urgently required is for member states to debate and negotiate what UN peacekeeping should be doing in the 21st Century. Without structural reforms, explicit political strategies and conceptual clarity, UN peacekeeping will continue to disappoint and risks losing its legitimacy and credibility. Once gone, no amount of reinforcements will bring that back and the world will be worse off for such a loss.






[4] First in Kigali in March, 2015.

[5]  “Twenty‐first century UN peace operations: protection, force and the changing security environment.”






[11] “All necessary means to what ends? The unintended consequences of the ‘robust turn’ in UN peace operations”


UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial London 2016

Securitising West Africa’s Ebola Pandemic: Implications for the Future of UN Peace Operations

By Obinna Ifediora



At the climax of the 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa, the international community, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff [CCDS)]), the United States of America, and the World Health Organisation (WHO), had to adopt extraordinary measure in order to effectively address the global and regional threat posed by the EVD. These responses were considered unnecessary, not conducive for long-term health system capacity-building in West Africa, dangerous, and strategically counterproductive.  This blog article reviews these claims in a context of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges to global security vis-à-vis the underlying motivations to employ a securitised response by the international community. It finds that in the absence of a securitised approach to the threat posed by the EVD, the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) projection that without additional measures to control the spread of the virus up to 1.4 million people are likely to contract Ebola in West Africa by January 2015 could have happened. It suggests that this security approach is consistent with the growing practice of securitising public health challenges to human security: from HIV/AIDS to malaria, cholera, and Ebola and Zika viruses.

It concludes by noting that the global response to the EVD epidemic in West Africa was a turning point, as well as a precedent, in combating future public health challenges; for the first time in the UN history of maintaining international peace and security, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in an uncharacteristic move, authorised and deployed a ‘health mission’ to West Africa. In many ways, this is the first demonstrable evidence of the reframing of the future of UN peace operations  focusing, primarily, on the people.

Securitizing a Public Health Pandemic – theory and debate

The securitisation theory refers to the processes of presenting an issue as posing an ‘existential threat’ to a ‘referent object’, such populations, which requires extraordinary measures beyond the routine and norms of everyday politics to address. On the international level, the securitisation idea provides a framework that enables the presentation of an issue as urgent and existential, so important that it should not be treated in the context of normal politics.

Critics of the securitisation theory argue that excessive securitisation could render security politically ineffective, intellectually incoherent and confrontational to civil and developmental issues; the EVD challenge being one of such issues. Reviewing global response to the EVD outbreak, this article presents an alternative understanding of the potential implications of securitisation of health pandemics. Here, securitisation framework is understood as representing potential opportunities for addressing public health risks without necessarily triggering a traditional ‘military-type’ response, and also the prospect it embodies for the idea of the new security consensus.  Securitisation approach, when viewed from this perspective, provides the necessary impetus for mobilising the international community towards the desired action.

Responses to the Ebola pandemic are instructive: Following the first confirmed case of Ebola in Guinea on 21 March 2014, the WHO published official Ebola notification on 24 March 2014, and eventually a team of medical experts under its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GORAN) arrived in Guinea. The EVD outbreak was discussed at a summit of the Heads of States and Government (HSG) of ECOWAS in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire between 28 and 29 March 2014 where an initial appeal for international aid was made. These early responses, however, failed to grasp the enormity and potential ramifications of the challenges posed by Ebola. The WHO initially treated the outbreak as a localised infection requiring routine measures to contain; while for ECOWAS, it was a developmental issue, at best.

From Inertia to Action – securitising Ebola and its policy implications

Four months into the unprecedented devastation wrecked by Ebola, a policy shift eventually occurred, by which time there were 1,711 cases of infections of which 1,070 were confirmed, 436 probable, 205 suspect, and 932 deaths.

In July 2014, the WHO re-graded EVD from Grade 2 to Grade 3, the highest emergency level, which signified ‘the existence of a single or multiple country events with substantial public health consequences that require a substantial WCO [WHO Country Office] response’. Consequently, on 8 August 2014, following the first meeting of the International Health Regulation (IHR) Committee, a unanimous decision pursuant to Article 12(4) (e) of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) stated that, ‘the conditions for a public health emergency of international concern have been met’ and that ‘the Ebola outbreak in West Africa constitutes an extraordinary event and a public health risk to other states’.

The ECOWAS CCDS, in an Emergency Session in Accra, Ghana, on 8 December 2014, called for urgent military contributions by member states to halt the devastation caused by the EVD outbreak in the region. By placing the Ebola pandemic prior to other security issues it had to confront in the region, the CCDS asked for medical military personnel, supported by civilian components, in line with Article 89 of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 2008.

On 19 August 2014, the AU PSC, referring to the ‘emergency situation caused by Ebola’, implemented Articles 6(f) and 13(3) (f) of its Protocol and authorised humanitarian action and disaster management response. Consequently, the AU Support Mission for the fight against the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (ASEOWA) was established on 29 October 2014, comprising of military and civilian components, including 1,000 health workers. To finance ASEOWA, the AU requisitioned funds from its Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine and Special Fund Contributions – internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

There is nothing in the foregoing to suggest a traditional military-style operation; but rather, an innovative African hybrid military-civilian response to a catastrophic humanitarian event caused by a health pandemic. The AU understood the urgency of the situation and decided to reallocate funds that were not specifically earmarked for such situations.

The measures adopted by the UNSC on 18 September 2014, and the UN General Assembly declaration on 19 September 2014, resulted in the establishment of the UN Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). UNMEERS’s primary objectives were to stop the outbreak, treat the infected, provide essential services, preserve stability and prevent further outbreaks.

Conclusion: securitising Ebola into a ‘health mission’

In activating the UN’s system-wide crises response mechanism, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that ‘I have decided to establish a United Nations emergency health mission combining the World Health Organization’s strategic perspective with a very strong logistics and operational capability’. In essence, UNMEER was not a peacekeeping mission in the context of a classical approach to ‘maintaining international peace and security’, but a ‘health mission’ with full logistical support from existing assets from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). More so, US troops were deployed in West Africa to address America’s national security  concerns occasioned by the EVD pandemic in the context of providing expertise in logistics, training and engineering.

There is no evidence thus far to suggest that securitising the global response to Ebola amounted to a military operation or even to suggest a future role for UN blue-helmets. However, there may be a role for UN white-helmets in combating public health crises in the future, such as with the case of the Zika virus outbreak in Brazil. Available evidence demonstrates genuine multilateral humanitarianism in protecting the people of West Africa, and the world, from an existential threat posed by Ebola virus by utilising ‘securitising speech-act’ methodology to galvanise hitherto dormant, but overwhelming global capacities to save human lives, restore stability, and revive economic growth and development.

Granted that a securitised response to health crises may not be appropriate for structural human protection – that is, health systems capacity-building and development in West Africa – a securitised measure, nevertheless, helped to achieve the core purpose of operational human protection – that is, halting the spread of the EVD, treating infected people, preserving stability, and preventing future outbreaks.

The overbearing global capacities that were brought to bear on the threat of EVD to the international community ensured that the US CDC projection that over one million people could be infected by January 2015 did not materialise. Additionally, the urgency and priority that securitisation gave to the Ebola crisis exposed capacity gaps in global-regional preparedness for health emergencies, thus providing the platform for the ongoing debate on reforming global health governance systems.

Understanding the changing nature of threats to international, regional and national peace and security gives credence to the securitisation framework as a relevant and viable political tool for mobilising global political will and appropriate capacities in responding to such threats. Today, the international community recognises that challenges of governance underline the numerous threats it confronts, especially relating to human security: from terrorism to irregular migration, human trafficking, poverty, growing youth unemployment, internal displacement, refugees, and diseases. These are the threats the UN peace operations is being repositioned to address. Regarding public health crises, authorising UN health missions is now expected to become the norm.  The future is here.



Human Protection across Regions


Bangkok meeting

Learning from Norm Promotion and Capacity Building in Southeast Asia and Africa

Charles T. Hunt and Noel M. Morada

This blog is based on the Introduction in a recently published special issue, ‘Southeast Asia-Africa Dialogue: Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building in Human Protection’, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol.8, No.2-3 (2016).

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The special issue, guest edited by Charles T. Hunt & Noel M. Morada, is concerned with learning from Norm Promotion and Capacity Building in Southeast Asia and Africa.

The collection of articles is the product of the Southeast Asia-Africa Dialogue held in Bangkok on 29-30 October 2014 organized by the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Department of International Relations at Chulalongkorn University. The dialogue was part of the Centre’s initiative on South-South exchange among scholars, practitioners and civil society advocates from the two regions.

The main objectives of the Bangkok workshop were as follows:

  1. Provide a venue for dialogue and exchange of ideas among scholars, civil society representatives, and practitioners on the current state, dynamics, and challenges in norm promotion and capacity building in human rights, mass atrocities prevention, and civilian protection in Southeast Asia and Africa;
  2. Identify the challenges and opportunities confronting regional institutions or frameworks such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), as well as sub-regional arrangements in implementing these norms; and
  3. Highlight the roles played by various stakeholders in building the capacity of states and regional arrangements in these regions in preventing and responding to human protection issues.

The contributors to the Special Issue, who attended the workshop, are from academe and civil society.  Some have been, or continue to be, directly engaged in norm promotion and capacity building on human protection issues in Southeast Asia and Africa. Their insights and analyses of the challenges and opportunities faced by states and societies in the two regions on human protection contribute a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of translating principles and norms on human rights protection into practice.

The first set of articles in the issue focus on Southeast Asia. Noel M. Morada’s overview of ASEAN regionalism examines the evolution and milestones of the regional organisation concerning human rights protection norms. Sriprapha Petcharamesree’s article examines the ASEAN human rights regime, specifically the challenges and prospects of mainstreaming the R2P in the region by examining the roles and performance of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza’s article examines the link between Women, Peace and Security (WPS) global agenda and ASEAN’s regional agenda on human protection and atrocities prevention. Lastly, Alex J. Bellamy’s article examines the Asia Pacific region’s engagement and translation of the R2P principle from commitment to practice.

The second set of articles in the issue focus on Africa. Charles T. Hunt’s overview of regionalism in Africa examines the extent to which human protection norms have diffused in the continent’s regional organisations and communities. Chukwuemeka B. Eze’s contribution is focused on the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in promoting human protection norms in the West African sub-region. Tim Murithi’s article evaluates the role of the AU as a norm entrepreneur, specifically examining the promotion of pan-African norms that relate to sovereignty and non-interference, and how human protection and mass atrocities prevention norms have evolved and been incorporated within the AU over time.  Obinna Ifediora’s article then explores the institutional and governance capacity of the AU to meet an enhanced ‘regional responsibility to protect’.  Finally, Phil Orchard contributes to the Issue with a timely comparative study of the contrasting experience of internally displaced persons and the responses formulated in response to these populations by the AU and ASEAN.